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IN REM TAX FORECLOSURE IN ERIE COUNTY-
INVIOLABLE TITLE?
Introdu&ction.,
In 1939, the New York State Legislature enacted the Uronm
DELnIquENT TAx ENFORCEMENT ACT.' Superseding the provisions
of any speoials general, or local law, the Act -was (designed to
afford any tax. district which chose to elect its provisions a new
mode of collecting unpaid property taxes by foreclosure pro-
ceedings. 2 A tax district was defined to include any county, city,
town, village, or school district, having power to enforce the col-
lection of taxes on real property by tax sale.8
To methods of foreclosure were offered: (A) foreclosure of a
tax lien as in an action to foreclose a mortgage ;4 (B) foreclosure
of a tax lien by an action in rem." Either method, or both methods,
could be elected by any tax district.' The election was to be ex-
pressed by filing a certificate to that effect in the office of the
county clerk in which the tax district is situated7
Erie County elected both methods,' and filed a certificate to
that effect in the Erie County Clerk's Office in 1942. The scope
of this comment is limited to the second method of foreclosing
tax liens, i. e., by foreclosure in rem.
constittioaityf
The Constitutions of the United States 9 and of New York
State ° declare that no person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. There is no precise definition of due
process; in substance, its fundamental requirement is that the
person whose interests are being affected through litigation be
1. Laws of 1939. c. 962, §2.
2. TAX LAW j 162.
3. Id. § 162 (2) a.
4. Id..Ait 7-A, Title 2.
5. Id. Art. 7-A, Title 3.
6. Id. § 162.
I. Id. §162.
8. Em Cou=nt TAX Acr, Art. 9,Art. 1t
9. U. S. Co=. A=ww. XIV'.
10. N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 6.
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given reasonable notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to
appear and be heard."' The Constitution was never intended to
perpetuate any particular method. 2 A State legislature, in its
discretion, may prescribe any manner of notice, as long as the
fundamental requirement of reasonableness is preserved. What
is reasonable notice must, by necessity, be adjudged in light of the
circumstances of the particular case and the practical affairs of
men.1.
4
Tax foreclosure sales are not unique. The establishment of
a Sovereign creates a right to procure the revenue necessary to
sustain itself in discharging its sovereign duties. Taxation of
real property is a ready and ancient source of revenue. Owners
of property within the State have knowledge of an annual prop-
erty tax, and of their duty to pay it. The State, to carry on its
necessary functions,. requires some necessary guarantee for per-
forming this duty. Foreclosure of the tax is the most effective
guarantee, but foreclosure in persoaam is too costly to be prac-
tical. The State legislature has realized this imposing obstacle,
and has devised a more expedient and economical substitute, the
in rem foreclosure. Charged with knowledge of the laws of the
State, the owner of property is presumed to know that failure to
pay his annual property tax will subject his land to the risk of an
in rein foreclosure. This presumed knowledge, coupled with the
annual obligation to pay his property tax, places a duty of inquiry
upon the owner, a duty that is greater than the normal interest a
person has in the welfare of his real possessions.
In the light of this burden of inquiry, service by publication,
as prescribed by the New York and Erie County Act, has been held
to satisfy the due process requirements of the New York Consti-
tution, and to constitute reasonable notice of the proceedings."
There has been no express United States Supreme Court
decision sustaining the provision for notice in the New York law
as meeting the due process requirements of the United States
Constitution. However, the absence of an express decision, it is
submitted, does not warrant a rational doubt of the constitution-
11. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457 (1940).
12. City of Utica v. Proite, 178 Misc. 925, 36-N. Y. S. 2d 79 (Sup. Ct. 1941);
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306 (1950).
13. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra n. 12.
14. Ballar v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241 (1906).
15. City of Utica v. Proite, supra n. 12; City of Buffalo v. Hawkes, 226 App. Div.
48, 236 N. Y. Supp. 89 (4th Dep't 1929), aff'd, 251 N. Y. 588, 168 N. E. 438 (1929).
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ality. In Delavan Home and Land Co. v. Brie County, 6 the
question of constitutionality was appealed, by right, to the United
States Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal for want of a
substantial federal question, citing decisions in which they had
sustained in rem acts from other states. It is submitted that the
dismissal of the appeal by the United States Supreme Court
amounted to an implied affirmance of the New York and Erie
County Act. The inference is irrebutable in the light of decisions
of the Supreme Court sustaining as constitutional the in rem laws
of other States17-substantially similar to the Erie County Act-
on precisely the same grounds as indicated above. Accordingly,
the inviolability of an in rein title in Erie County is rationally
secure from due process attack.
Infants and Incompetents
The interests of infants and incompetents have traditionally
(at common law, and now by statute) been protected by the courts.
The reason for this protection is public policy-infants and in-
competents are not responsible to their own interests. When the
law does permit them to be sued in personam, it secures their in-
terests by requiring that service be made upon the infant's
guardian and upon the incompetent's committee.'8 Consequently,
it might appear that in an in rem foreclosure, where service is by
publication, the interests of infants and incompetents are slighted,
because no provision for service is contained which would bring
notice of the proceedings to the attention of those in whom the
guardianship and protection of the infant's and incompetent's
interests are lodged. But the appearance is deceiving.
Ownership of land entails obligations, one of which is the
payment of an annual property tax. If the infant or incompetent
has enough capacity to own and manage land himself, then he is
obliged to pay taxes, and competent to realize the consequence
of default. If the land is managed by a guardian or committee,
because of the inability of the infant or incompetent to care for
it, then the guardian or committee is charged -with the duty of
meeting the yearly levy, and similarly charged -with knowledge
of the consequence of default in payment.
16, 188 Misc. 299, 67 N. Y S. 2d 829 (Sup. Ct. 1945), af'd, 294 N. Y. 847, 62
N. E. 2d 396 (1945), app. dismissed, 325 U. S. 681 (1945).
17. Nebraska: Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1904); Washington: Ontario Land
Co. v. Yordy, 212 U. S. 152 (1908); Minnesota: Winona & St. Peter Land Co. v.
Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526 (1895) ; Michigan: Longyear v. Toolan, 209 U. S. 414 (1907);
Arkansas: Ballar v. Hunter, supra n. 14.
18. NEW YoRK CIV. PRAc. AcT §§225, 226.
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A strong policy argument also exists. The success of collect-
ing delinquent taxes by in rein foreclosure is intricately depend-
ent on the ability of the County to convey a strong title. A titl-
that was imperfect as to infants or incompetents would be frail
indeed. But regardless of which policy might seem more para-
mount, the New York Law19 and the Erie County Act ° both state
that an in rein foreclosure shall terminate the rights and equitiesof infants and incompetents. The provision was upheld in Lyn-
brook Gardens v. Ullman.2'
Soldiers and Sailors
The SoLIRERs' A-,D SALoms' Civi R LmF ACT was enacted by
Congress in 1940.22 Its purpose was to strengthen the emergency
effort by suspending enforcement of civil liabilities of persons
in the nilitary service of the United States so as to enable such
persons to devote their entire energies to the needs of the nation.
Section 525 of the Act states that "the period of military service
shall not . . . be included in computing any period . . .provided
by a law for the redemption of real property sold . . .to enforce
any . . . tax . . " Another section 560, states that where
delinquent tax foreclosure proceedings had been consummated,
by leave of court, against real property owned and occupied for
"dwelling, professional, business, or agricultural purposes . .."
by a person in military service, the zerviceman might bring an
action to redeem his foreclosed property at any time not later
than six months after discharge. Both sections have been upheld
as constitutional. 23  Reading §525, which speaks of any fore-
closure, in pari materia with §560, which specifies only fore-
closures of "dwelling, professional, business, or agricultural prop-
erty," it might appear that the application of the general language
of §525 was intended to be limited to the specific dwelling, pro-
fessional, business, or agricultural purposes particularized in
§560. If that construction were true, then at least some in rem
fttles---i. e., property foreclosed for delinquent taxes which was
owned by a serviceman for other than dwelling, professional,
business, or. agricultural uses-would be immune from the Act.
But the opposite is true. The sections were read "with an eye
friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their
19. § 165-h (6).
20. Art 11, § 11-19.0.
21. 179 Misc. 132, 36 N. .Y. S. 2d 888 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
22. 54 STAT. 1178, 50 U. S. C. App. § 501 (1940).
23. U. S. v. Alberts, 59 F. Supp. 298 (E. D. Wash. 1945) ; La Maistre v. Leffers,
333 U. S. 1 (1948).
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country's call . . " by the Supreme Court in La Maistre v.
Leffers. 4 Consequently, §525 permits a discharged serviceman
to recover any of his property from a good faith purchaser by
redeeming it within the time allowed for redemption, excluding his
time in service. Section 560 grants a returned serviceman six
months after discharge within which to start action to redeem
any property which he has occupied for dwelling, professional,
business, or agricultural purposes, and which was sold for de-
linquent taxes to a good faith purchaser. The inviolability of
an in rem title in Erie County is perceptibly shaken by the effect
of the FEDERAL SOLDIERS' AN -D SAILORS' CivnL RELmF ACT, for if
permits a watchful discharged serviceman to recover his property
from an unsuspecting purchaser years after it was sold for de-
linquent taxes.
Irregularities and Defects
The procedural steps in foreclosing a delinquent tax by au
i4 rem action are somewhat involved. Lists are prepared, affi-
davits made and filed, indexing done, publication, posting, mailing,
and more affidavits made and filed. A problem arises as to what
effect the omission or mistake as to any of these involved pro-
cedural steps has on the inviolability of an in rem title in Erie
County.
It should be remembered that an in rem title rests on a judg-
ment. The judgment of a court is valid where the court has juris-
diction over the person or property involved in the litigation, and
jurisdiction over the subject matter. If either is lacking, the
judgment is void and can generally be collaterally attacked.-5
Under the Erie County Act, jurisdiction is not needed over the
person of the owner because the action is directed against the
property, i. e., the property is the defendant.
Jurisdiction over the property is had by reason of its location
within the County of Erie. But a prerequisite for valid juris-
diction over the property is that notice be given to the owner.2
Notice by publication is sufficient.27 Because notice is a pre-
requisite to obtaining jurisdietiou over the property, a purchaser
at an in rem foreclosure sale should ascertain whether the technical
requirements of publication and posting have been complied with
to the letter of the statute.28
24. 333 U. S. 1. 6 (1948).
25. Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217 (1878).
26. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274 (1876).
27. See discussion, supra, and cases collected in n. 17.
28. See Hogg v. Allen, 196 Misc. 265, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
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Jurisdiction over the subject matter requires that the court
have the statutory or constitutional power to hear tie abstract
question involved in the proceedings. 9 If the proceeding were
held in the County Court of Erie County, jurisdiction over the
subject matter would exist, for it is expressly conferred by
statute.80  But like all statutory causes of action, a problem of
construction arises as to whether literal compliance with the
technical provision is an essential prerequisite to the court's
power over the subject matter (i. e., mandatory), or merely a
prerequisite to the right of the plaintiff to maintain the action
(i. e., directory). 1  The consequences are deeply significant. If
literal compliance with the technical provisions is mandatory,
then any mistake or omission is a jurisdictional defect, which
renders the judgment a nullity. But if literal compliance is only
directory, then a mistake or omission is only an irregularity,
which is merged in the judgment, and if not corrected by appeal,
becomes res judicata.
With respect to the solution of this problem, as with any
question of statutory construction, the primary consideration is
that of determining legislative intent. The statute itself contains
some express statements of intent.32 Judicial decision has added
others. 3
Perhaps the best guide to assist in interpreting the legislative
intent in the in rem situation is common sense, i. e., essential re-
quirements should be mandatory, incidental requirements should
be directory.3 4 But the task of construction grows more difficult
when dealing with the statutory requirement that foreclosure caii
be commenced against property on which "taxes are in default.".
The general rule in the United States is that delinquency is
directory.3 5 The reason advanced to sustain the construction is
29. Hunt v. Hunt, supra n. 25.
30. Tax Law § 165-a (1) c.
31. 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3d. ed. 1943) § 5801 et seq.
32. All provisions with respect to procedure requiring acts to be done within
specified times, except provisions with respect to notice, are directory, TAx LAw § 166-q;
failure to mail tax bills is directory, TAx LAw § 166-c; the inadvertent failure of
collecting officer to include in the list is directory, TAXx LAw § 165-a.
33. Publication for 49 days is mandatory, Village of Pleasantville v. Gross, 272App. Div. 932, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 100 (2d Dep't 1947), aff'd, 297 N. Y. 767, 77 N. E.
2d N. E. 2d 787 (1947) ; filing of resolution of election is directory, Hogg v. Allen,
supra n. 28.
34. SUTHERLAND, op. cit. supra n. 31, § 5813; Fauntleroy v. Lurn, 210 U. S. 230
(1907).
35. Gaylord v. Scarff, 6 Iowa 179 (1858); Kneeland v. Wood, 117 Mich. 174,
75 N. W. 461 (1898) ; Rogers v. Dent, 292 Mo. 576, 239 S. W. 1079 (1922) ; Chauncey
v. Wass, 35 Minn. 1, 25 N. W. 457 (1886).
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that any other interpretation would take from a judgment the
conclusiveness which public policy says shall be given it. Hence,
the judgment constitutes res judicata as to the fact that taxes are
in default. This is the general rule.
New York has held otherwise. In Lynbrook Gardens v. Ul
man," the court stated that it was the legislative intent that
delinquency was necessary to give the court jurisdiction. The
reason.advanced to sustain this construction was that where the
owner had in fact paid his tax, he might justly conclude he was
in no legal peril of having his land sold for delinquency, and con-
sequently could not be charged with duty of looking to newspapers
and searching lists. The reasoning is more apposite if applied to
defective jurisdiction over the property, rather than to defective
jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Statute of Limitations
To repeat, irregularities in the tax foreclosure proceeding
are not a basis for collateral attack, because of res judicata.
But where the omission or mistake is adjudged jurisdictional, is
the purchaser's title always open to subsequent attack9 If it
were, an Erie County in rein title would be very shaky indeed.
Presumably to avoid this weakness, the State Legislature added
an amendment to the TAx LAW in 1948'7 which states that no ac-
tion can be maintained to upset a tax sale deed after two years
from the date of record of that deed. The language of the amend-
ment seems to manifest a clear and definite legislative intent,-
that jurisdictiona] defects, whether over the property, or the sub-
ject matter, as a ground for collateral attack, are lost by recording
the tax foreclosure deed, and the expiration of a two year period
of limitation. There have been no adjudications sustaining this
amendment. However, a legislature may legally enact a statute
of limitations which will thereafter bar the assertion of any right
to question jurisdictional defects.'
Conclusion
It is submitted that the provision for notice by publication
contained in the Erie County Tax Act is constitutional; that the
36. Supra n. 21.
37. § 165-h (7).
38. Marx v. Hawthorn, 148 U. S. 172 (1893); query, would such a statute sever
the right of a non-delinquent owner to contest the in rem sale? The writers feel it would
not: delinquency is necessary in order to create a duty of inquiry. For the same reason
that the absence of this duty renders publicatibn in rem void, so would it invalidate the
running of a statute of limitations. Knowledge or reason to know is a prerequisite to due
process, whether by publication, or by recording a deed. Cf. Matter of City of New
York, 212 N. Y. 538, 106 N. E. 631 (1914).
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rights of infants and'incompetents are severed by the foreclosure
sale; that a purchaser at a County sale acquires a title which is
protected by res judicata from irregularities; that jurisdictional
defects, generally, are not grounds for upsetting the purchasdrs'
title if the deed is recorded and the two year statutory period has
expired; but that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act per-
mits a returned serviceman to redeem his foreclosed property"iff
he acts promptly.
Matthew X. Wagner, Sr.
Robert C. Schaus
MUNICIPAL TAXPAYERS AND STANDING TO SUE
Introduction *
It is in the area of public law that one encounters the popular
impatience with a judicial attitude which requires, not only a
defined controversy, but also a plaintiff legally interested in if3
outcome. It is proposed in this comment to examine one part of
the general problem of standing to sue, a part in which this popu-
lar impatience has perhaps made itself felt, and the courts have
relaxed their traditional standards.
The specific problem to be considered herein is, in an actioi
against a municipal corporation or its agents, -what standing to sue
has a plaintiff solely by virtue of the fact that he is a taxpayer?
This is the initial query in all taxpayers' suits, which have been
defined as follows:
Taxpayers' suits are actions by one or more taxpayers
acting not alone as individuals but as representatives of the
other taxpayers, to prevent acts which will injure the tax-
payers and 'which are ultra vires or unauthorized, i. e., suits
to vindicate the public and common right to have the public
funds and property. preserved from spoliation by public
officers and devoted only to public uses; and also suits on be-
half of the municipal corporation.1
It is evident that a taxpayer's bill is a class bill, filed in the com-
mon interest of all taxpayers of the municipality,2 so that plain-
tiff has no private interest entitling him to sue. If he possesses
such a concern, it is not a taxpayer's action. Accordingly, if a
1. 18 McQumI.A, MuNciPAL CoRPOn oNs (3rd ed. 1950), 3.
2. Schlanger v. West Berzack Borough, 261 Pa. 605, 104 At. 764 (1918).
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